Polish Demographics: Scared People Don’t Have Children
In 2022, for the first time in its history, Poland was inhabited by over 40 million people. However, this is just a momentary “success” albeit a bitter one, as it was caused by the cruel aggression of the Russian Federation, which drove millions of Ukrainian citizens, mostly women, children, and elderly people, out of their country. Initially, most refugees found temporary or permanent shelter in Poland, only to later either return to their country or move elsewhere.
In reality, Poland’s demographic prospects don’t look very promising. Although the country doesn’t rank at the top of the list of fastest depopulating nations, and the National Census of 2021 (conducted every ten years) showed a decrease in Poland’s population of “only” half a million, which is slightly more than 1 percent, the trends are not optimistic.
Law and Justice, the ruling party for the eighth year, went to the polls in 2015 with the slogan of strong support for families and fertility. The flagship policy and symbol of social policy was the Family 500+ program, which provided a benefit of 500 Polish zloty (approximately 120 euros) per month for the second and each subsequent child, and for every child in poorer families. To Western readers, the amount may seem modest, but especially in the realities of Polish provinces, with high unemployment and a minimum wage below 1500 Polish zloty net, it was significant.
After winning the elections, the government of Beata Szydło adopted the project as a priority. The opposition and numerous experts warned that the program (initially costing over 1 percent of GDP annually) would lead to a public finance disaster. However, nothing of the sort happened. Firstly, actions were taken concurrently to increase budget revenues, not by raising taxes, but by tightening the system, preventing and prosecuting fraud, especially in VAT. Secondly, it turned out (which was not entirely foreseen by the proponents) that the program not only provided a demand stimulus but also increased mobility and willingness to work. This was contrary to what opponents predicted, claiming that a benefit equivalent to the minimum wage (for a family with three children and low income) would take hundreds of thousands of women out of the labour market, as it simply wouldn’t be worth it for them to engage in low-paying jobs.
Nevertheless, the first phase of 500+ was a huge success. The fertility rate increased from 1,3 to 1,45 within two years, and the labour force participation of Poles increased instead of decreasing. This was especially evident in the poorest regions.
This success seemed to be a perpetual motion machine. More and more Poles were working, translating into all other economic indicators. It is enough to note that in 2003, 13,8 million Poles were employed, at the beginning of the PiS government, their number exceeded 16 million, and recently, it approached 17 million and soon surpassed this record. And all this with a more or less stable, and even slightly decreasing, population.
The government decided to follow up on this success. It announced further programs, such as free school supplies, Maluch+ (12 000 zloty to be used in the first two years of a child’s life), as well as expanding the 500 zloty benefit to the first child regardless of the family’s wealth. In addition, an extensive program of incentives for opening nurseries and kindergartens was introduced (the number of places in the former tripled during PiS’s tenure and exceeded 200 000).
The initial success of PiS’s social policy exceeded expectations, becoming the basis for high and lasting public support for this party and attracting interest from other countries grappling with demographic crises. The ruling party won the elections independently for the second time in 2019 – the first such case in the democratic history of Poland.
However, the growth in fertility ceased in 2018. It can be assumed that the “simple reserve” resulting from refraining from having children solely due to difficult material conditions was exhausted. Moreover, labour market activation began to have a negative demographic effect. And the fear of unemployment, which was until recently widespread and well-remembered, prompted women to return to work quickly after giving birth to one child, instead of staying at home and having another pregnancy. A characteristic phenomenon of the last decade has become the “2+1” family model instead of the previously basic “2+2”.
In addition, there were cultural phenomena such as self-centeredness and so-called self-realization. Young, economically successful people realized that the world offers them many ways to spend time and money other than having children. Previously, lower classes were rather deprived of such dilemmas – because they simply couldn’t afford foreign trips or anything other than the cheapest cars or apartment renovations.
In 2020, the pandemic struck, and two years later, there was a war right beyond our borders. The sense of fear, uncertainty, and loneliness, especially among young people, became dominant, especially as the multidimensional political struggle that was taking place in the country and abroad further fuelled people’s fears – for example, the climate catastrophe, Russian aggression, or death in the gynaecological ward.
An additional factor of uncertainty became the enormous rise in housing prices. Under different circumstances, it would have been considered a sign of exceptional economic prosperity, but in an era of pessimism and fear (although objective indicators do not justify it), a widespread sense is created that young people have no chance of buying their own apartment. And even renting, at least in big cities, where rents soared with the influx of Ukrainian refugees.
It seems that simple economic incentives have stopped motivating young Poles. After the elections in October 2023, the new government, regardless of who forms it, will struggle with the problem of how to encourage people to have children. And it will have to find an answer once again to the question of why in a country of economic and social success, fertility is declining.
Marek Wróbel
The material was created as part of the project “North and South – internationalization of activities of the Republican Foundation” co-financed by NIW-CRSO under the Civil Society Organizations Development Program for the years 2018-2030 (PROO).
